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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiffs Steven and Michele Stern, and Michele Stern's 
brother Michael Scillitani (as trustee), each own real 
property in Berkeley Township, New Jersey, which is served 
by privately-owned well water. Defendant Berkeley 
Township Municipal Utilities Authority ("BTMUA"), 
pursuant to local ordinances, ordered the plaintiffs to 
connect to the municipal water supply and, through 
various enforcement proceedings, placed a lien on the trust 
property administered by Michael Scillitani when he 
refused. Plaintiffs brought suit against BTMUA, the 
Township, and local officials, alleging that the mandatory 
connection requirement is unconstitutional, at least as 
applied to them, because it is beyond the powers of a 
municipality; because it constitutes a taking; and because 
it unlawfully forces them into an unwanted contract. The 
plaintiffs wish to avoid a connection to the municipal water 
supply with its attendant costs and to continue using their 
private wells for drinking and other household purposes. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, finding that there was a rational basis for the 
ordinances. We affirm. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Berkeley Township Ordinance 90-16-OAB requires that, 
within 90 days after a BTMUA water supply line is made 
available, property owners must hook up their buildings to 
the municipal system and must also permanently 
disconnect their private wells from the potable water supply 
for the buildings. See Berkeley Township, N.J., Ordinance 
90-16-OAB S 2 (Apr. 23, 1990). The ordinance also allows 
BTMUA to make any required connection, installation, or 
well sealing if an owner fails to do so after receiving notice. 
The owner can be charged for such actions, and the 
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charges will be a lien on the owner's property until they are 
paid. See 90-16-OAB S 9. A second ordinance similarly 
authorizes BTMUA to charge property owners for 
connection and service charges "after the homeowner has 
received all notices to hook up to the water system and the 
time period for . . . connection has expired." Berkeley 
Township, N.J., Ordinance 94-23-OAB S 128-21 (June 28, 
1994). 
 
In 1994, both the Sterns and the trust received notice 
that BTMUA was to provide their properties with connection 
to the municipal water supply. In due course, both the 
Sterns and the trust received notice that the 90-day period 
for connecting to the water supply had expired and that 
they would be liable for all connection and service charges. 
In 1995, BTMUA issued summonses charging the trust 
with failure to connect to the water supply pursuant to 
township ordinance 94-23-OAB. A lien was imposed on the 
trust property. The plaintiffs then filed virtually identical 
pro se petitions in the district court for "a writ of 
protection" alleging violations of 18 U.S.C.S 241, 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1985(3) & 1983, and the Fifth and Ninth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. 
 
The defendants are BTMUA; the Township; Francis X. 
Halligan, Jr., the municipal court judge in Berkeley 
Township who arraigned Scillitani pursuant to the 1995 
summonses; and Jeffrey Flatt, the BTMUA plant supervisor 
who issued the summonses. The defendants moved for 
summary judgment, which the district court granted. The 
plaintiffs, now represented by counsel, appeal only the 
ruling as it applies to their SS 1983 and 1985 claims.1 
 
II. The Substantive Due Process Claim 
 
The plaintiffs contend that Township Ordinance 90-16- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court granted summary judgment on the 18 U.S.C. S 241 
claim because there is no private cause of action under the criminal 
statute. See Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987). 
We note that, although the issue was not raised by the parties, all claims 
against the magistrate judge would have to be dismissed in any event on 
the grounds of judicial immunity. 
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OAB, which requires residents to hook up to the public 
water supply when it becomes available and to discontinue 
the use of well water in the home, violates the United 
States Constitution because their well water is "safe and 
pure."2 They do not identify precisely what parts of the 
Constitution are thereby implicated, though we understand 
them to be making the claim that the ordinance is 
irrational and therefore violates substantive due process. In 
their reply brief, the plaintiffs also appear to invoke a 
general right to be free from government action by quoting 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1922). 
Even if this claim had been preserved,3  we do not consider 
the right to be free from municipal water connections to be 
part of the right to privacy as it has developed since Meyer. 
See Town of Ennis v. Stewart, 807 P.2d 179, 182 (Mont. 
1991) (rejecting an identical claim). 
 
We have made clear that when "general economic and 
social welfare legislation" is alleged to violate substantive 
due process, it should be struck down only when it fails to 
meet a minimum rationality standard, an "extremely 
difficult" standard for a plaintiff to meet. Knight v. Tape, 
Inc., 935 F.2d 617, 627 (3d Cir. 1991). The only question is 
"whether the law at issue bears any rational relationship to 
any interest that the state legitimately may promote," id.; 
simple unfairness will not suffice to invalidate a law. The 
challenger bears the burden of proving irrationality. See 
Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688, 694 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Neither side presents much evidence about the safety of the particular 
wells on the two properties. Plaintiffs' brief states that their water 
"has 
been tested and passed all tests with flying colors." However, the record 
does not contain any evidence of such testing. What little testimony 
there is in the record about well safety is in Jeffrey Flatt's affidavit, 
which states that there is a contaminated well approximately one half 
mile from the plaintiffs' properties. Moreover, the affidavit states that 
wells can become contaminated overnight. At all events, this case does 
not turn on these considerations. 
 
3. A party cannot raise issues for the first time in a reply brief. See 
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 71 n.5 
(3d Cir. 1994); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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The plaintiffs have not met their burden. Protecting the 
health, safety, and general welfare of township inhabitants, 
the goal of the challenged ordinances, is plainly in the 
public interest. Private wells can be unsafe for a 
disturbingly long list of reasons. Potential dangers include: 
carcinogenic radon, radium-226, and radium-228;4 salt 
from road-salting stockpiles or saline aquifers; pesticides; 
fertilizers; explosive methane; MTBE (a gasoline additive); 
fuel from leaking underground tanks; bacteria-laden waste 
from leaking septic tanks, broken sewer lines, pets, farm 
animals, or wildlife; and chemical or other hazardous 
waste. See Roger M. Waller, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. 
Dep't of Interior, Ground Water and the Rural Homeowner 
20-30 (1994). Furthermore, private wells are generally 
shallower than public supply wells and thus more easily 
contaminated. 
 
These potential harms provide ample justification for 
government action to safeguard citizens. Because pure 
water is a precondition for human health, regulating the 
water supply is a basic and legitimate governmental 
activity. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 
43 S. Ct. 534 (1923); City of Newark v. Department of 
Health, 262 A.2d 718 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970). A 
municipal water supply replaces a myriad of private water 
sources that may be unmonitored or, at best, difficult, 
expensive, and inefficient to monitor. Therefore, a 
legislature may rationally conclude that a public water 
supply is the simplest and safest solution for its citizenry 
as a whole without proof of danger to each and every 
affected person. The danger is significant, the burden of 
connecting to nearby waterlines is not great, and the costs 
and benefits of such legislation are widely shared 
throughout the area of service. For these reasons, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Levels of radium and nitrate contamination are higher in private wells 
than in public supply wells. See U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep't of 
Interior, Radium-226 and Radium-228 in Shallow Ground Water, 
Southern New Jersey, Fact Sheet FS-062-98, June 1998, at 5 & tbl.2. It 
also appears that contaminated private wells are a significant problem in 
many areas of New Jersey, including Ocean County, where the plaintiffs' 
property is located. See Maureen Graham & Frederick Cusick, Radium 
Tainting Water in N.J. Wells, Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 9, 1998, at A1. 
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overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the 
issue have found that mandatory connection to public 
water is a legitimate exercise of police power. See, e.g., 
Shrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp. 1236 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 626 
F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1979); Lepre v. D'Iberville Water & 
Sewer Dist., 376 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1979); Town of Ennis, 
807 P.2d at 184; New Jersey v. Kusznikow, No. A-971-94T3 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 1996); Rupp v. Grantsville 
City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980); Tidewater Ass'n of 
Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 400 S.E.2d 
523, 526 (Va. 1991); Weber City Sanitation Comm'n v. Craft, 
87 S.E.2d 153, 159 (Va. 1955). 
 
The only case supporting the plaintiffs' position is City of 
Midway v. Midway Nursing & Convalescent Center, Inc., 
195 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. 1973).5 There, the Georgia Supreme 
Court found that mandating a connection to a public water 
supply was not a reasonable manner of protecting the 
health and welfare of citizens. City of Midway has been 
criticized by other courts for a crabbed understanding of 
the scope of a municipality's police power over health and 
safety issues. See, e.g., Town of Ennis, 807 P.2d at 182-83. 
Moreover, City of Midway was decided under state law that 
required grants of power to municipal corporations to be 
construed strictly, see City of Midway, 195 S.E.2d at 454, 
whereas we are evaluating only whether the ordinance 
meets the minimum standards of rationality required of 
social welfare regulation under the Due Process Clause. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The plaintiffs also cite Frier v. City of Douglas, 213 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. 
1975), for the proposition that safety concerns alone cannot justify a 
mandatory connection ordinance. We cannot discern the difference 
between "safety" and "health" in this situation, but even were we to find 
the distinction persuasive, Frier would be inapposite. That case turned in 
large part on the court's interpretation of the Georgia law at issue, 
which 
was worded restrictively in ways not present here. See id. at 609. Frier, 
moreover, concerned electricity rather than water, and involved an owner 
who wanted no electricity whatsoever. Here, the plaintiffs obviously want 
to use water, but from their own source. The appropriate analogy is not 
to Frier but to a case in which a homeowner wished to provide his or her 
own electricity from a source that might without warning become unsafe; 
in such a case the city would doubtless be able to require the 
homeowner to use the public system if he or she wished to use electricity 
at all. 
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We do not have the authority to second-guess rational 
legislative judgments of this sort. A legislature may be risk- 
averse even when there is no evidence of immediate harzard 
and some citizens are willing to run the risk of future harm. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has upheld mandatory water 
connections even though the parties before the court 
stipulated that the plaintiffs' wells were currently safe: 
 
       A local governing body must necessarily enjoy broad 
       discretionary powers to protect the public health and 
       general welfare of its residents. To anticipate seemingly 
       unlikely events . . . as public health hazards may be to 
       exercise commendable prudence and foresight. There is 
       no requirement that protective measures be limited to 
       actions taken after a crisis has arisen or a catastrophic 
       disaster has struck. 
 
McMahon v. City of Virginia Beach, 267 S.E.2d 130, 134 
(Va. 1980). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Montana 
upheld a mandatory water connection law without evidence 
of immediate health threats to any well-water user in the 
affected area, because "the potential for such problems 
always exists. A municipal water system is better suited to 
meet these health concerns and prevent potential health 
problems that could arise absent such a system." Town of 
Ennis, 807 P.2d at 183.6 
 
City of Midway distinguished sewers, which it thought 
sufficiently important to justify mandatory connection laws, 
from water, which it found mostly harmless. We may accept 
that sewers are even more vital than clean drinking water. 
However, cases addressing sewers also support the 
proposition that only a low level of risk is required to justify 
mandatory connections. In Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 
227 U.S. 303, 33 S. Ct. 290 (1913), for example, although 
the Supreme Court posited that there was "no necessity on 
account of health or sanitary conditions" to require a sewer 
connection to the owner's land, id. at 305, and even noted 
the possibility that the construction of a sewer line might 
pose interim health hazards, the Court upheld the sewer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that the town of Ennis, the self-proclaimed "Fly Fishing 
Capitol of America," is in the midst of the pristine "Big Sky Country," 
and yet still perceived the need for a municipal water supply. 
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connection requirement as a constitutional exercise of 
police power. See id.; see also Alperstein v. Three Lakes 
Water & Sanitation Dist., 710 P.2d 118 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1985) (rejecting a requirement of individualized 
determination of sanitation risk for mandatory sewer 
connection); Bingham Farms v. Ferris, 384 N.W.2d 129, 133 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (same). As another court explained: 
"Municipal governments are not required to gamble against 
public health risks. To protect the public health, as well as 
to promote public safety, a legislative body may adopt `the 
most conservative course which science and engineering 
offer.' " City of Nokomis v. Sullivan, 153 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ill. 
1958) (quoting Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 
80, 83, 66 S.Ct. 850 (1946)). 
 
The harms averted by sewer systems may well be greater 
than the harms averted by municipal water sources. But 
the plaintiffs have offered no evidence that the disparity in 
risk is sufficient to disregard these precedents. See 
Shrader, 471 F. Supp. at 1243 (finding "no meaningful 
distinction between mandatory sewer connection and 
mandatory water connection"); Lepre, 376 So. 2d at 193 
(applying sewer connection precedents to a mandatory 
water connection ordinance). 
 
The plaintiffs additionally claim that their case is distinct 
from other mandatory connection cases because the 
ordinance at issue may require them to cap or disconnect 
their wells in addition to requiring them to hook up to 
municipal water. We need not interpret the ordinance at 
this level of detail, however, because this slight additional 
burden makes no difference to the outcome of this case. 
Requiring disconnection of indoor water from a potentially 
dangerous source is part of the general protective legislative 
scheme and works no unjustifiable harm on the plaintiffs. 
See Renne v. Township of Waterford, 252 N.W.2d 842, 846 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding a sewer connection 
requirement and a ban on the use of a functioning septic 
tank); Weber City Sanitation Comm'n (upholding a 
mandatory water connection and well disconnection 
ordinance); cf. Andres v. City of Perrysburg, 546 N.E.2d 
1377, 1381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting a takings claim 
for a mandatory sewer connection where local law also 
required all connected property to be annexed by the city). 
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Consequently, plaintiffs have no right to have their wells 
service their houses, even though the township has not 
proven that the wells are dangerous. Indeed, even if the 
plaintiffs can prove the current safety of their water, they 
would not be exempt from the generally applicable 
connection requirement. Mere over- or underinclusiveness 
will not invalidate social welfare regulation so long as the 
state action represents a rational response to a legitimate 
problem. See Lindsey Coal Mining Co., 90 F.3d at 694-95. 
Mandatory connections to public utilities are classic 
examples of social welfare regulations that merely adjust 
the burdens and benefits of life in the modern world. It 
cannot escape our notice that from the inception of such 
sanitary programs--and even during the Lochner era-- 
courts have routinely rejected constitutional challenges to 
mandatory connection requirements. See, e.g., City of 
Mountain Home v. Ray, 267 S.W.2d 503 (Ark. 1954); 
Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 256 P.2d 515 (Idaho 1953) 
(collecting cases); Township of Bedford v. Bates , 233 
N.W.2d 706 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (collecting cases); New 
Jersey v. Mayor of Paterson, 51 A. 922 (N.J. 1902); McNeill 
v. Harnell County, 398 S.E.2d 475 (N.C. 1990) (collecting 
cases); Bigler v. Greenwood, 254 P.2d 843 (Utah 1953). 
 
In the end, the plaintiffs' apparently quite sincere belief 
that the ordinance represents an unjustified intrusion on 
their rights as citizens does not carry the day. Most laws 
appear intrusively burdensome to at least some of those 
whose conduct is thereby governed. But the legislature may 
respond to potential threats to the safety and welfare of its 
citizens, and may require even those who consider 
themselves careful or lucky enough to escape harm to 
comply with generally applicable laws. 
 
III. The Takings Claim 
 
The plaintiffs contend that their takings claim was not 
addressed by the district court, and that the matter should 
thus be remanded. It does not appear, however, that the 
issue was fairly presented to the district court. The pro se 
petition filed in district court contains numerous 
unexplained citations of various laws and cases, including 
a quotation of the Fifth Amendment in its entirety. The 
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relief sought did not include just compensation; instead, 
the petition sought to prevent the township from enforcing 
its ordinances and, in the alternative, demanded that the 
township accede to certain conditions (compensation for the 
well not among them) if connection were to be required. 
Although we construe the pro se petition liberally, see 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we cannot 
find a takings claim. Moreover, we would lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over a takings claim, because plaintiffs 
must first exhaust state remedies before a federal court 
may entertain a regulatory takings claim. See Williamson 
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). The plaintiffs have not, so far 
as the record shows, sought compensation through state 
proceedings. Accordingly, plaintiffs' takings claim must be 
rejected.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Such a claim would be meritless in any event. The Supreme Court has 
noted that, after a finding that due process has not been violated, "it 
would be surprising indeed to discover a [regulatory] taking," because 
the relevant analysis is so similar. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223, 106 S. Ct. 1018 (1986). Moreover, regulatory 
taking, requiring just compensation therefor, occurs when there has 
been a deprivation of "all economically beneficial use" of property. Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992). The property at issue is not to be divided up between affected 
and unaffected parts; otherwise, every regulation would be a taking of 
the entirety of that which it prohibits. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). There is no 
indication that the plaintiffs' wells constitute all (or, indeed, any) of 
the 
economic value of their land. The value of the water pipes running from 
the plaintiffs' wells to their houses and of the limited amount of 
interior 
plumbing affected by the disconnection does not begin to approach the 
total destruction of value required before we willfind a taking. See, 
e.g., 
Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 463, 468 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (taking a "narrow view" of regulatory takings); Elsmere Park 
Club Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Elsmere, 771 F. Supp. 646, 653 (D. Del. 
1991) (holding that a regulation preventing the use of an apartment 
complex basement for residences was not a taking because so much of 
the property remained unaffected). 
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IV. The Contract Claim 
 
The plaintiffs submit that they are being forced into a 
contract with BTMUA involuntarily. The plaintiffs briefly 
claim that the ordinance violates the federal and New 
Jersey state constitutional provisions prohibiting laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts. The argument is 
plainly lacking in merit, because the ordinance does not 
impair any contracts. 
 
The plaintiffs then argue that general principles of 
contract law prohibit the township from charging fees for 
unwanted water service. Their claim is mistaken, because 
government is not required to deal with citizens on a purely 
contractual basis, as the mandatory connection cases 
discussed above demonstrate. The plaintiffs may be 
required to obtain their water service from BTMUA and to 
pay for that service just as they may be required to adhere 
to other laws that, one way or another, cost money. 8 The 
only forced contract is the broader social contract, which is 
part of the nation's polity and as such is unchallengable 
here. 
 
Relying on New Jersey statutory law, the plaintiffs further 
argue that they may not be charged fees for utility service 
if they have not affirmatively applied for a service contract. 
The governing statute, however, lists contractual relations 
as only one of the potential sources of a payment 
obligation. Municipal authorities may collect fees for 
connection to and use of the water system from "any 
person contracting for . . . connection or use, products or 
services . . . or from the owner or occupant, or both of them, 
of any real property which directly or indirectly is or has 
been connected with the water system or to which directly 
or indirectly has been supplied or furnished such use, 
products or services of the water system . . . ." N.J.S.A. 
S 40:14B-21 (1991) (emphasis added). Therefore, upon 
connection, BTMUA is authorized to charge the owners for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The situation here is similar to the requirement that automobile 
owners pay for annual inspections in order to drive their cars legally. 
The state, in establishing inspection centers, provides a service that 
owners must purchase if they wish to drive. 
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connection costs and water used, whether they want it or 
not. 
 
To bolster their contractual claim, the plaintiffs cite 
Austin v. Mayor of Union Beach, 160 A. 318 (N.J. 1932), 
Ivan v. Marlboro Township Municipal Utilities Authority, 393 
A.2d 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), and Daniel v. 
Borough of Oakland, 304 A.2d 757 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1973), in which municipalities did not connect the 
respective plaintiffs to the public water system and the 
plaintiffs had no contracts for service. In those cases the 
New Jersey courts found that the plaintiffs could not be 
assessed water service charges. Those cases are not on 
point, however, because they did not involve connection 
requirements; service was apparently voluntary. 
 
Moreover, New Jersey law is clear that public utilities 
may require citizens to pay fees even if the citizens do not 
contract with the utilities. In Airwick Industries, Inc. v. 
Carlstadt Sewerage Authority, 270 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1970), the 
New Jersey Supreme Court decided that nonusers of a 
sewer system could be required to pay a share of system 
construction costs because they benefited from the 
existence of and potential connection to the system. When 
a municipality requires connection to a public utility, it is 
legitimate to require payment to cover both construction 
costs and use and maintenance charges. See also Mayor of 
Paterson (holding that a city may construct connections to 
link individual houses to a sewer and then charge the costs 
to the property thereby benefited). 
 
The plaintiffs do not assert that the connection fee or the 
service fees are unreasonable.9 It is true that there is no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The plaintiffs apparently argue that they may not be charged "water 
service" fees when a connection has not yet been made to their houses. 
This claim stems from New Jersey law, which provides that nonusers 
within the area of a municipal utility may be charged debt service fees 
but may not be charged for operation and maintenance costs or use fees 
unless they actually use the municipal services. See Airwick Indus., 270 
A.2d at 25. The plaintiffs may be arguing that, even if they have to pay 
for the water connection, they cannot be charged for operation and 
maintenance costs and use fees until they have first been forced to make 
the connection. (It is difficult to ascertain the actual argument, because 
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indication in the record which ordinance, if any, specifies 
the rates for BTMUA. Nonetheless, this is not relevant to 
their claim, as municipal rate fixing is governed by the 
authorizing statute and general principles of 
reasonableness and uniformity. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has held that municipalities have plenary statutory 
power to charge for sewer and water services, subject only 
to review for patent unreasonableness. See Meglino v. 
Township Comm., 510 A.2d 1134, 1138 (N.J. 1986). 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
One might sympathize with the plaintiffs' apparently 
sincere desire to maintain their own wells for their private 
use. Their grievances must, however, be addressed to the 
political branches, for we have no authority to upset 
rational, nondiscriminatory legislation addressing potential 
dangers to the health and safety of the community. We will 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the plaintiffs couple the invalid claim that they do not want a connection 
with the potentially valid claim that they do not currently have such a 
connection.) Unfortunately, the plaintiffs did not make this distinction 
in 
the district court, where they attacked the ordinance in much broader 
terms. Furthermore, the record lacks any indication of whether or not 
they were charged operation and maintenance costs and use fees within 
the meaning of the law before connection was made. Nor did Airwick 
Industries address the case in which an owner wrongfully refuses 
connection and then claims immunity from paying the associated 
charges, because in Airwick Industries the New Jersey Supreme Court 
addresssed the claims of owners of unimproved land who had nothing to 
connect when the municipal authority began coverage of their land. See 
id. Thus, it would be inappropriate for us to interpret New Jersey law at 
this time or to opine whether the plaintiffs may have a more limited 
claim in state court, provided that it is not claim precluded. 
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